Fingerprint Presentation Attacks: Tackling the Ongoing Arms Race in Biometric Authentication

Roberto Casula;Antonio Galli;Michela Gravina;Stefano Marrone;Domenico Mattiello;Marco Micheletto;Giulia Orru';Gian Luca Marcialis;Carlo Sansone

2023-01-01

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Abstract

The widespread use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) in consumer electronics opens for the development of advanced presentation attacks, i.e. procedures designed to bypass an AFIS using a forged fingerprint. As a consequence, AFIS are often equipped with a fingerprint presentation attack detection (FPAD) module, to recognize live fingerprints from fake replicas, in order to both minimize the risk of unauthorized access and avoid pointless computations. The ongoing arms race between attackers and detector designers demands a comprehensive understanding of both the defender’s and attacker’s perspectives to develop robust and efficient FPAD systems. This paper proposes a dual-perspective approach to FPAD, which encompasses the presentation of a new technique for carrying out presentation attacks starting from perturbed samples with adversarial techniques and the presentation of a new detection technique based on an adversarial data augmentation strategy. In this case, attack and defence are based on the same assumptions demonstrating that this dual research approach can be exploited to enhance the overall security of fingerprint recognition systems against spoofing attacks.