A Look At Non-Cooperative Presentation Attacks in Fingerprint Systems

Emanuela Marasco

Conceptualization

;Stefany Cando

Investigation

;Larry Tang

Validation

;Luca Ghiani

Writing - Review & Editing

;Gian Luca Marcialis

Supervision

2019-01-01

---

Abstract

Scientific literature lacks of countermeasures specifically for fingerprint presentation attacks (PAs) realized with non-cooperative methods; even though, in realistic scenarios, it is unlikely that individuals would agree to duplicate their fingerprints. For example, replicas can be created from finger marks left on a surface without the person's knowledge. Existing anti-spoofing mechanisms are trained to detect presentation attacks realized with cooperation of the user and are assumed to be able to identify non-cooperative spoofs as well. In this regard, latent prints are perceived to be of low quality and less likely to succeed in gaining unauthorized access. Thus, they are expected to be blocked without the need of a particular presentation attack detection system. Currently, the lowest Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) error rates on spoofs from latent prints are achieved using frameworks involving Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) trained on cooperative PAs; however, the computational requirement of these networks does not make them easily portable for mobile applications. Therefore, the focus of this paper is to investigate the degree of success of spoofs made from latent fingerprints to improve the understanding of their vitality features. Furthermore, we experimentally show the performance drop of existing liveness detectors when dealing with non-cooperative attacks and analyze the quality estimates pertaining to such spoofs, which are commonly believed to be of lower quality compared to the molds fabricated with user's consensus.