Il pensiero come limite del diritto
Gometz, Gianmarco
2018-01-01
Abstract
Through the concept of "harmful thought" and its comparison with the category of "preparatory action", Frederick Schauer questions the soundness of the distinction between "thinking" and "doing" and dismantles the traditional account of freedom of thought. Yet some reasons to keep a legally relevant distinction between action and thought seem to attain to the unknowableness of the latter, related to both factual and normative reasons: we don't have any technical means to discover directly and promptly "thoughts" independently from their manifestations, and anyway a hypothetical direct knowledge of the psyche would be the most serious violation of privacy that we can imagine, with considerable repercussions on individual autonomy. Moreover, keeping a principle of freedom of thought prevents the public authorities from imputing too arbitrarily and irresponsibly legal consequences, even punitive, to what just in a rather uncertain and indirect way can be considered "cause" of harm.File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
Nuovo documento 2018-09-18 11.23.38.pdf Solo gestori archivio
Type: versione editoriale
Size 4.69 MB
Format Adobe PDF
|
4.69 MB | Adobe PDF | & nbsp; View / Open Request a copy |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.