On the epistemology of coincidental events

Melas A;SALIS, PIETRO MARIA

2014-01-01

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Abstract

According to a causal view of chance, the intersections between totally independent causal chains originate accidental events, called “absolute-coincidences” (Monod, 1970). The present study focuses on the epistemological aspects of this causal view. More precisely, these are the main problems we investigate: 1. How much important is the degree of the epistemic access in order to identify absolute-coincidences? There could be events that are not absolute-coincidences but, since our knowledge is insufficient, we consider them as absolutely-coincidental. Conversely, there could be events that are absolute-coincidences but, since our knowledge is insufficient, we do not consider them as absolutely-coincidental. Here, our information about the independence of the causal lines involved seems to play a crucial role. 2. Are absolute-coincidences mind-dependent events? The representational background seems to be important in choosing the causal lines involved. Moreover, in identifying absolute-coincidences there seems to be something more than the independence between the causal lines we consider; something such as relevance and so on. This essay aims to prove that: a) the degree of the epistemic access is crucial to grasp absolute-coincidences; b) mental aspects are constitutive of absolute-coincidences.