La Disgiunzione di Gödel
Francesco Beccuti
2018-01-01
Abstract
Gödel’s disjunction is the philosophical thesis according to which either it is impossible to mechanize the mathematical endeavour or else there exist absolutely unsolvable mathematical problems. After briefly describing the historical and theoretical context of the disjunction, we stress its relevance to both philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of mind. We then present a possible proof of the disjunction by highlighting its philosophical and mathematical assumptions as well as the problems of idealization involved. Furthermore, we discuss in detail the two horns of the disjunction together with various attempts to establish their respective validity.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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